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A CURRENT REGIME OF UNCERTAINTY:
IMPROVING ASSESSMENTS OF LIABILITY FOR DAMAGES CAUSED
BY ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
Mousa Alshanteer *
The use of artificial intelligence (AI) within the healthcare
industry, especially within the practice of telehealth or
telemedicine, is quickly gaining momentum. Courts, however, face
great difficulty in addressing the question of liability as it pertains
to such use of AI, specifically due to the inconsistency in the
distinction between medical device and medical procedure and the
inconsistency in the application of different standards of care and
preemption conditions to AI. Courts should adopt a new guiding
principle and frame the question of liability as it pertains to the use
of AI within the healthcare industry as one of either medical
malpractice or product liability, specifically accounting for the
extent to which AI dictates the course of the healthcare provided to
patients.
I.
II.

INTRODUCTION .....................................................................28
THE EMERGING APPLICATION OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY
THROUGH THE LENS OF THE PRACTICE OF TELEHEALTH
AND TELEMEDICINE .............................................................32
III. LIABILITY ISSUES RAISED BY THE EMERGING APPLICATION
OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE WITHIN TELEHEALTH AND
TELEMEDICINE .....................................................................37
IV. APPROACHES COURTS MAY TAKE WHEN FACED WITH
TELEHEALTH AND TELEMEDICINE LIABILITY ISSUES ........41

Mousa Alshanteer is a second-year law student at the University of North
Carolina, eternally grateful for the assistance of Professor Richard Saver in
reviewing and providing feedback on several drafts of this recent development.
*

27

28

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 21: 27

A. The Inconsistency in the Distinction Between Medical
Device and Medical Procedure or Service and the Effect
of Such Distinction Upon Theories of Liability ..............42
B. The Inconsistency in the Application of Different Sets of
Legislation and Regulation and the Effect of Such
Application Upon Applicable Standards of Care and
Preemption Conditions ...................................................46
V. A RECOMMENDATION AS TO HOW THE COURTS OUGHT TO
MODIFY THEIR APPROACH WHEN FACED WITH SUCH
LIABILITY ISSUES .................................................................50
VI. CONCLUSION ........................................................................55
I.
INTRODUCTION
Ponder the following: You roll over in your bed, unable to
muster the strength to arise and seize the day. Lightheaded, you
reach for the tissues on your nightstand. You then rummage around
for your iPhone, eventually accessing your home screen and
navigating to an application dubbed “Your.MD.” 1
The application greets you with a simple message: “Tell me
about the symptoms you have today.” 2 Your thumbs go to work.
“Fatigue.” “Headache.” “Runny Nose.” Ellipses crop up in the
bottom left-hand corner of your screen. “How long have you had
these symptoms for?” 3 You continue communicating with that
which any rational person would presume is a licensed healthcare
practitioner, ultimately being presented with a list of diagnoses,
causes, and treatments.
You do not realize that you have been communicating with a
chatbot, a form of artificial intelligence (AI) that is increasingly
being employed by healthcare providers, enabling users to bypass
initial, in-person visits with their healthcare practitioners, prepare

Your.MD, Your.MD April 2017 Demo, YOUTUBE (May 11, 2017),
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DFzN-3IqPEg
[https://perma.cc/9ANAC7T3].
2
Id.
3
Id.
1
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for follow-up visits and procedures, and maintain observance of
their individual care plans. 4
The use of AI within the healthcare industry is quickly gaining
momentum. The federal government, under its Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services, has actively supported and
incentivized the use of AI by awarding grants to healthcare
providers seeking to employ the technology. 5 The U.S. Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) recently approved the first use of an
autonomous AI system by the University of Iowa. 6 Federal
government support and advancements in AI render unsurprising
the recent finding by the U.S. Department of Health and Human
Services that the majority of healthcare providers employ some
form of AI. 7

Rachel Z. Arndt, Healthcare Providers are Teaming with Chatbots to Assist
HEALTHCARE
(Dec.
8,
2018),
Patients,
MODERN
https://www.modernhealthcare.com/article/20181208/TRANSFORMATION01/
181209977/healthcare-providers-are-teaming-with-chatbots-to-assist-patients
[https://perma.cc/N78B-Z7RL].
5
See, e.g., Ctrs. for Medicare & Medicaid Servs., Artificial Intelligence (AI)
Health Outcomes Challenge, CMS.GOV (last updated Aug. 1, 2019),
https://innovation.cms.gov/initiatives/artificial-intelligence-health-outcomeschallenge [https://perma.cc/J3VD-ATE5] (announcing receipt by Centers for
Medicare and Medicaid Services of over three hundred applications for grants
by innovators seeking to demonstrate how artificial intelligence may be used to
predict unplanned hospital and skilled nursing facility admissions and adverse
events).
6
Bill Siwicki, University of Iowa Healthcare Rolls Out First Autonomous AI
Diagnostic System Cleared by the FDA, HEALTHCAREITNEWS (July 12, 2018),
https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/university-iowa-healthcare-rolls-outfirst-autonomous-ai-diagnostic-system-cleared-fda
[https://perma.cc/Y9AQZNMG].
7
See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., REPORT TO
CONGRESS:
E-HEALTH
AND
TELEMEDICINE
3–4
(2016),
https://aspe.hhs.gov/system/files/pdf/206751/TelemedicineE-HealthReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/ZH2G-RPHF] (“[I]t is estimated that sixty-one percent of
health care institutions currently use some form of telehealth, and between forty
and fifty percent of all hospitals in the United States currently employ some
form of telehealth.” (internal citations omitted) Smartphone applications are
included as forms of telehealth identified by the U.S. Department for Health and
Human Services).
4
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State and federal courts have rarely been presented with the
question of liability as it pertains to the use of AI within the
healthcare industry, specifically within the practice of telehealth or
telemedicine. The distinction between medical device and medical
procedure or service limits the theories of liability upon which the
courts currently rely. If an AI platform is deemed by the FDA to
constitute a medical device, for instance, the development of the
platform by the developer is generally subject to product liability
standards. If, on the other hand, an AI platform is deemed by the
FDA to constitute a medical procedure or service, the use of the
platform by the healthcare practitioner is generally subject to
medical malpractice standards. The standards are substantially
different. The former provides for strict liability in the absence of
fault on the part of such developers and practitioners and the
potential imposition of punitive damages and the latter provides for
liability only where such developers and practitioners breach their
duty to act reasonably. Courts therefore face great difficulty in
addressing the question of liability as it pertains to the use of AI
within the healthcare industry, particularly given the inconsistency
in the distinction between medical device and medical procedure
or service and the fact that such a distinction limits the theories
upon which courts currently rely.
The courts face further difficulty, given the inconsistency in the
application of existing legislation and regulation to AI platforms
and, specifically, in the application of different standards of care
and preemption conditions for such platforms. Some states, for
instance, require that healthcare practitioners exercise a degree of
care that the general, nationwide healthcare profession ordinarily
exercises under the same or similar conditions and circumstances.
Some other states require that practitioners exercise a degree of
care that the healthcare profession ordinarily exercises within the
same community or locality. Others have adopted a hybrid
standard of care that comprises elements of the national standard
and the community or locality standard. Such inconsistency is
rendered much more drastic depending upon the elected approach
of the FDA in characterizing AI platforms. If the FDA approves an
AI platform as a medical device subject to its regulations, it partly
preempts product liability claims against healthcare developers.
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Alternatively, if it refuses to approve an AI platform as a medical
device subject to its regulations, the FDA enables individuals to
bring any liability claims against healthcare developers and
practitioners, including medical malpractice and product liability
claims.
The inconsistencies in the distinction between medical device
and medical procedure and in the application of different sets of
legislation and regulation to AI platforms create uncertainty for
courts, developers of AI platforms, and the healthcare providers
utilizing such platforms. This uncertainty permeates throughout the
potential liability of developers and providers, jeopardizing the
health and safety of patients in the process.
Such uncertainty may also be abridged by a more uniform
adoption of existing theories of liability and standards of care by
courts. With the assistance of federal legislation or administrative
regulation, promulgated by the FDA, courts should adopt a new
guiding principle and frame the question of liability as it pertains
to the use of AI within the healthcare industry and, specifically,
within the practice of telehealth or telemedicine as one of either
medical malpractice or product liability.
In deciding between the two theories of liability, courts should
account for the extent to which AI platforms dictate the course of
the healthcare provided to patients. In cases of medical
malpractice, in particular, the standard of care to which such
platforms will be expected to adhere ought to be that of the
reasonably prudent healthcare practitioner whose professional
judgement would have governed in the absence of such platforms.
Given variation between the different standards of care established
by the states, as well as the fact that telehealth or telemedicine
applications of AI enable healthcare services to be provided across
different states, courts should ultimately assess the standard of care
to which such applications will be expected to adhere on a national
basis. Such uniform adoption by the courts may ensure that
developers and healthcare providers are held more accountable for
their negligent development and use of AI and may ensure that
patients are safeguarded.

32
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This article will proceed in five parts. Part II will offer a brief
discussion of the emerging application of AI within the healthcare
industry and, specifically, within the practice of telehealth or
telemedicine. Part III will assess the liability issues raised by such
an application. Part IV will offer an analysis of the varying theories
of liability that courts currently rely upon when presented with
such liability issues. Finally, Part V will offer a recommendation as
to how courts should adopt a more uniform approach to such
liability issues and address any pertinent considerations and
counterarguments.
THE EMERGING APPLICATION OF ARTIFICIAL
INTELLIGENCE WITHIN THE HEALTHCARE INDUSTRY THROUGH
THE LENS OF THE PRACTICE OF TELEHEALTH AND
TELEMEDICINE
In a report from its annual meeting held last year, the American
Medical Association defined AI as “a host of computational
methods that produce systems that perform tasks normally
requiring human intelligence. These computational methods
include, but are not limited to, machine image recognition, natural
language processing, and machine learning.” 8
The use of AI within the healthcare industry is quickly gaining
momentum. Healthcare insurance providers, for instance, have
employed claims review processes that utilize AI to review the
medical records of individuals and identify those at risk of
incurring the most substantial costs for healthcare services. 9
Healthcare practitioners have similarly employed clinical decision
II.

Iliana Peters et al., Insight: AI in Health Care – A Look at Critical Data
Regulations, BIG L. BUS. (Aug. 23, 2019), https://www.bloomberglaw.com/
document/X4I35I1G000000?bna_news_filter=health-law-andbusiness&jcsearch=BNA%25200000016c4e33dcb4a17f5fff34220001#jcite
[https://perma.cc/5PWJ-J58G].
9
See, e.g., Susan Morse, How Health Insurance Companies Use AI to Make
(Nov.
9,
2018),
Consumers
Healthier,
HEALTHCARE FINANCE
https://www.healthcarefinancenews.com/news/how-health-insurancecompanies-use-ai-make-consumers-healthier
[https://perma.cc/Q2YJ-8XZX]
(Prognos, for instance, “uses a lab registry of 18 billion clinical records to
stratify risk for a group of beneficiaries who have just enrolled.”).
8
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support systems that utilize AI to align observations of patients
with their individualized genetics, medical histories, and symptoms
as well as generalized population-based healthcare knowledge and,
thereby, assist the practitioners in improving their decision-making
at the point of care. 10 As an example, Saint Luke’s Health System
in Kansas City, Missouri, identified that a number of its patients
transferred from community-based and rural hospitals passed away
due to not being diagnosed with sepsis early enough. 11 Saint
Luke’s Health System began employing a clinical decision support
system that assesses the lab work and vital signs records of transfer
patients pursuant to an algorithm, enabling the transfer team to
identify transfer patients with sepsis and administer treatment
thereto, decreasing the mortality rate thereof by thirty percent. 12 In
other contexts, healthcare practitioners have also employed
software that utilizes AI to recognize their individualized speech
and vocabulary and automatically create transcriptions of their
speech, enabling them to more accurately document their sessions
with patients without expending as much time. 13
Specifically, the use of AI is proliferating within the practice of
telehealth or telemedicine, as the amount of AI and healthcare
practitioners consulting with patients via telecommunications is
increasing. 14 The majority of AI uses within the practice comprise
See, e.g., Bill Siwicki, New Study Identifies Top 11 Clinical Decision
(Oct.
9,
2018),
Support
Vendors,
HEALTHCAREITNEWS
https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/new-study-identifies-top-11-clinicaldecision-support-vendors
[https://perma.cc/9RHD-NJ2W]
(“Seventy-four
percent of healthcare provider organizations use clinical decision support
technology, according to a new study from Reaction Data relying on CDS to
make more informed medication orders (30%), lab orders (24%), medical
imaging orders (20%), choosing wisely (13%) and other (13%).”).
11
Id.
12
Id.
13
See, e.g., Benjamin Harris, Using Artificial Intelligence, Speech
Recognition to Optimize Note Taking, HEALTHCAREITNEWS (June 11, 2019),
https://www.healthcareitnews.com/news/using-artificial-intelligence-speechrecognition-optimize-note-taking [https://perma.cc/JY3M-Z9Q7].
14
See, e.g., Kumba Sennaar, Artificial Intelligence in Telemedicine and
Telehealth – 4 Current Applications, EMERJ (Feb. 16, 2019),
https://emerj.com/ai-sector-overviews/artificial-intelligence-in-telemedicineand-telehealth [https://perma.cc/6MUB-KJG7] (“In an effort to increase clinical
10
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either diagnostic support or virtual consultation platforms. 15
Diagnostic support is the use of AI to operate chatbots, such as
those employed by the Your.MD application, that utilize machine
learning algorithms to recommend a diagnosis to patients based
upon their individualized genetics, medical histories, and
symptoms.16 Virtual consultation platforms, on the other hand,
employ clinical decision support systems, providing for remote
consultations between healthcare practitioners and their patients
and utilizing AI to align observations therefrom with the
individualized genetics, medical histories, and symptoms of the
patients as well as generalized population-based healthcare
knowledge. 17 The AI utilized by the virtual consultation platform
analyzes such data and provides recommendations to the
practitioners, assisting them in improving their decision-making at
the point of care. 18
HealthTap is one example of a diagnostic support platform
that, akin to Your.MD, employs chatbots to recommend a
diagnosis to patients based upon their individualized genetics,
medical histories, and symptoms. 19 The machine learning
algorithms utilized by the chatbots were developed over a six-year
period, based upon thousands of questions by patients and answers
by healthcare practitioners that span 141 medical specialties. 20 The
HealthTap platform has been downloaded over one million times. 21
Remarkably, its chatbots have answered over 2.6 million

and administrative capacity through telehealth, researchers are developing AIdriven technology for healthcare professionals and consumers.”).
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Id.
18
Id. (Lemonaid Health, a virtual consultation platform, requires patients to
complete an online health questionnaire, including information on their
allergies, medications, medical history, and symptoms, and then uses such
information to match the patient with a healthcare practitioner within two
minutes.).
19
Id.
20
Id.
21
Id.
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questions. 22 AdaHealth, another example of a diagnostic support
platform, has been downloaded over four million times. 23
InfiniteMD, conversely, is one example of a virtual
consultation platform that specifically provides for second-opinion
remote consultations between healthcare practitioners and cancer
patients. The platform further utilizes AI to align observations
therefrom with the individualized medical histories of the patients
as well as generalized clinical trial data and data from other
consultations conducted through the platform. In doing so, it
assists the practitioners in recommending particular clinical trials
for which the patients may be eligible. 24 InfiniteMD claims that
twenty-eight percent of its consultations resulted in a change or
correction in diagnosis, and that over seventy-two percent of its
consultations resulted in a revised treatment plan. 25 Lemonaid
Health, another example of a virtual consultation platform, has
processed over 48,000 consultations across fourteen states in just
over two years. 26
The use of AI within the practice of telehealth or telemedicine
is accompanied by reductions in healthcare expenditures by
healthcare insurers and providers as well as patients. 27 One review
See
HealthTap,
GOOGLE
PLAY
(Jan.
30,
2020),
https://play.google.com/store/apps/details?id=com.healthtap.userhtexpress&hl=e
nUS [https://perma.cc/79WJ-T5C2] (“Search content from over 2.6 million
doctor-answered questions and 700,000 topics and articles across over 850
conditions.”).
23
See Sennaar, supra note 14.
24
Id.
25
Justine Hofherr, The Doctor is in: How InfiniteMD Plans on Using AI to
Give Patients Second Opinions, BUILTINBOSTON (Feb. 9, 2018),
https://www.builtinboston.com/2018/02/09/how-infinitemd-using-ai-givepatients-second-opinions [https://perma.cc/94KM-LZK6].
26
Antoinette Siu, John Muir Expands Care With $25 Telemedicine Visits, S.F.
BUS. TIMES (Aug. 14, 2017), https://www.johnmuirhealth.com/about-john-muirhealth/press-room/Press-releases/2017-8-14-john-muir-health-expands-carewith-telemedicine.html [https://perma.cc/YET4-USCS].
27
See, e.g., Am. Telemedicine Ass’n., Examples of Research Outcomes:
Telemedicine’s Impact on Healthcare Cost and Quality 1, AM. TELEMEDICINE
ASS’N
(Apr.
2013),
https://www.amdtelemedicine.com/telemedicineresources/documents/ATATelemedicineResearchPaper_impact-on-healthcarecost-and-quality_April2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/4BNV-9Y5B] (“[S]tudies are
22

36
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of twenty-three different telehealth or telemedicine applications of
AI between 1997 and 2007, for instance, demonstrated reductions
in total cost, cost per patient, and cost per visit. 28 Additionally, the
American Telemedicine Association notes that “for most
telemedicine applications, studies have shown that there is no
difference in the ability of the provider to obtain clinical
information, make an accurate diagnosis, and develop a treatment
plan that produces the same desired clinical outcomes as compared
to in-person care when used appropriately.” 29 One review of
twenty-nine different telehealth or telemedicine applications of AI
between 2001 and 2007 demonstrated a moderate, positive, and
significant effect on clinical outcomes, particularly for
cardiovascular and psychiatric conditions. 30 Indeed, “using mobile
health to eliminate preventable human errors and promote
evidence-based decision-making would seem to increase the
quality of healthcare.” 31 Furthermore, patient satisfaction with the
use of AI in the practice of telehealth or telemedicine has
consistently been very high. 32 One examination that accounted for
differences in patient age, education, gender, income, insurance,
and race unearthed an overall patient satisfaction of 98.3%. 33 In
strong contrast, one examination of patient satisfaction with their
human healthcare providers, particularly among cardiovascular
patients, unearthed an overall patient satisfaction of 76.5%. 34

consistent in finding that telemedicine saves the patients, providers and payers
money when compared with traditional approaches to providing care.”).
28
Id. at 3.
29
Id. at 4.
30
Id. at 5.
31
Fazal Khan, The “Uberization” of Healthcare: The Forthcoming Legal
Storm Over Mobile Health Technology’s Impact on the Medical Profession, 26
HEALTH MATRIX 123, 129 (2016).
32
AM. TELEMEDICINE ASS’N., supra note 27, at 6.
33
Id. (stating the examination in question, while reported by the American
Telemedicine Association, was conducted independently, by Susan S. Gustke,
David C. Balch, Vivian L. West, and Lance O. Rogers).
34
Mohd Noor Norhayati et al., Patient Satisfaction with Doctor-Patient
Interaction and its Association with Modifiable Cardiovascular Risk Factors
Among Moderately-High Risk Patients in Primary Healthcare, 5 PEERJ (2017).

MAY 2020]

Improving Assessments of Liability

37

Nonetheless, the expanding use of AI within the healthcare
industry and, specifically, within the practice of telehealth or
telemedicine is also accompanied by surprisingly under-analyzed
issues of fraud and abuse, insurance coverage and reimbursement,
information privacy and security, licensure, and liability.35 For
instance, federal legislation on such use has predominately
addressed insurance coverage and reimbursement. 36 The Creating
High-Quality Results and Outcomes Necessary to Improve
Chronic Care Act of 2017, for instance, expanded Medicare
coverage and reimbursement to some telehealth or telemedicine
applications of AI. 37 State legislation on such use has
predominately addressed insurance coverage and reimbursement. 38
In 2017, for instance, sixty-two pieces of state legislation were
introduced in the legislatures of thirty-four states, most of which
predominately addressed insurance coverage and reimbursement. 39
Liability, in particular, has not been thoroughly addressed, leaving
unanswered questions regarding the attribution and evaluation of
responsibility for any injuries suffered by patients as a result of the
use of AI.
III.
LIABILITY ISSUES RAISED BY THE EMERGING
APPLICATION OF ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE WITHIN
TELEHEALTH AND TELEMEDICINE
The use of novel medical technologies within the healthcare
industry often brings about a reconceptualization of medical
liability, raising questions as to the applicability of various
standards of care and the identification of the responsible party for
negligence or wrongdoing. Artificial intelligence is no different. It
See generally Mei Kwong, Special Issue: What will 2018 Bring for
Telehealth Policy?, CTR. FOR CONNECTED HEALTH POL’Y (Jan. 2, 2017),
https://mailchi.mp/cchpca/special-issue-what-will-2018-bring-for-telehealthpolicy [https://perma.cc/89FK-QJHZ].
36
Id.
37
See generally Creating High-Quality Results and Outcomes Necessary to
Improve Chronic (CHRONIC) Care Act of 2017, S.870, 115th Cong. (2017).
38
See Kwong, supra note 35. (“The most frequently addressed issues in state
legislation were public and private payer reimbursement.”).
39
See id.
35

38

N.C. J.L. & TECH.

[VOL. 21: 27

is unique, however, in the issues it raises in the attribution and
evaluation of responsibility for any injuries suffered by patients as
a result of its use, particularly within the practice of telehealth or
telemedicine. For the first time, the observations and
recommendations of AI could depose the professional judgements
of rigorously trained healthcare practitioners. 40
Researchers at Stanford University recently developed an AI
platform that analyzed more than 100,000 chest X-rays made
publicly available by the National Institutes of Health, compared
the X-rays to those of HIV-positive patients in South Africa, and
demonstrated an ability to correctly diagnose tuberculosis among
such patients at a rate thirteen percent higher than healthcare
practitioners therein. 41 Researchers at Google similarly developed
an AI platform that analyzed a small subset of images of diabetic
retinopathy adjudicated by ophthalmologists that specialize in
retinal diseases and demonstrated an ability to adjudicate the
images of moderate or significant diabetic retinopathy on its own
at an accuracy of ninety-seven percent as compared to the accuracy
of eighty-four percent at which the ophthalmologists adjudicated
the images. 42 Researchers at Google and Stanford have thus
developed AI platforms that have accurately and constructively
deposed the professional judgements of healthcare practitioners.
Nonetheless, AI platforms are predisposed to certain biases that
healthcare practitioners may be better equipped to manage. For
instance, one hospital system used an AI platform to determine
whether its pneumonia patients would respond better to in-home
treatment than to treatment at the hospital system. In doing so, the
hospital system subjected itself to the biases inherent to the
See Gary E. Marchant & Lucille M. Tournas, AI Health Care Liability:
From Research Trials to Court Trials, J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 23, 26 (2019).
41
Richard Harris, How Can Doctors be Sure a Self-Taught Computer is
Making the Right Diagnosis?, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Apr. 1, 2019),
https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2019/04/01/708085617/how-candoctors-be-sure-a-self-taught-computer-is-making-the-right-diagnosis
[https://perma.cc/XXP2-XHWJ].
42
Laura Lovett, Google Researchers Find Trained AI Detects Diabetic
Retinopathy on Par with Experts, MOBI HEALTH NEWS (Mar. 14, 2018),
https://www.mobihealthnews.com/content/google-researchers-find-trained-aidetects-diabetic-retinopathy-par-experts [https://perma.cc/XU9H-MZ7C].
40
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underlying data and reasoning mechanisms employed by the AI. 43
The platform determined that asthmatic pneumonia patients would
respond better to in-home treatment based upon data demonstrating
that such patients achieved better outcomes than non-asthmatic
pneumonia patients when admitted to, and treated at, the hospital
system. 44 However, such data was indicative of asthmatic
pneumonia patients normally being admitted to acute care units,
where they receive immediate and focused treatment, due to their
being at a greater risk than non-asthmatic pneumonia patients. 45
Similarly, the AI platform developed by the researchers at
Stanford University was also subject to biases, recognizing in its
analysis and comparison of X-rays information around the edge of
the images that demonstrated the type of X-ray machine through
which the images were transmitted. 46 After detecting that a
portable X-ray machine had been used, the platform was more
likely to diagnose the HIV-positive patients with tuberculosis,
since such machines are more frequently used in hospitals and
pneumonia is more common amongst hospitalized patients than
amongst those who opt for office visits with their healthcare
practitioners, demonstrating that AI platforms are predisposed to
certain biases that healthcare practitioners may be better able to
account for. 47 “It was being a good machine-learning model and it
was aggressively using all available information baked into the
image to make its recommendations,” said one of the researchers
who developed the platform. 48 Even that, however, was not
enough.
Artificial intelligence, as employed within the practice of
telehealth or telemedicine, is no less predisposed to such biases.
For instance, Doctor Hazel, a virtual consultation platform, utilizes
Rich Caruana et al., Intelligible Models for HealthCare: Predicting
Pneumonia Risk and Hospital 30-Day Readmission, KD’15 PROCEEDINGS OF
THE 21ST ACM SIGKDD INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON KNOWLEDGE
DISCOVERY AND DATA MINING 1721 (2015).
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Harris, supra note 41.
47
Id.
48
Id.
43

40
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AI to determine whether photographs of moles uploaded by its
users are benign or potentially cancerous. 49 Doctor Hazel, however,
is predisposed to a sampling bias due to the minute amount of data
being analyzed and compared by the AI it utilizes. 50 The platform
reports its having correctly determined moles to be potentially
cancerous at a rate of eighty-five percent, demonstrating that there
exists substantial potential for its reporting of false negatives,
where users are told that their moles are benign when, in fact, they
are potentially cancerous. 51
A healthcare practitioner may better account for such biases,
demonstrating that the observations and recommendations of AI
perhaps ought not to so readily depose the professional judgments
of such practitioners. An overreliance on AI and its inherent biases
may nonetheless pose significant risks, particularly of
misdiagnoses, especially to those patients who seek to bypass inperson visits with their healthcare practitioners, prepare for followup visits and procedures, and maintain observance of their
individual care plans by means of applications of telehealth or
telemedicine. Accordingly, there exists, note researchers, “a
significant and growing liability exposure for health care
providers, product manufacturers, and health care institutions,
given the uncertainties created about whether, how, and when AI
should be measured, if at all, by traditional notions of the standard
of care.” 52
49
Dave Muoio, Doctor Hazel, an AI Aimed at Skin Cancer Detection, is
Latest in a Long Line, MOBI HEALTH NEWS (Sept. 18, 2017),
https://www.mobihealthnews.com/content/doctor-hazel-ai-aimed-skin-cancerdetection-latest-long-line [https://perma.cc/U4SQ-VZCM].
50
Sarah Buhr, Doctor Hazel Uses AI to Try to Determine if you Have Skin
Cancer, TECH CRUNCH (Sept. 17, 2017), https://techcrunch.com/2017/09/17/
doctor-hazel-uses-ai-to-try-to-determine-if-you-have-skin-cancer/
[https://perma.cc/6MVX-4X8S] (“The main hurdle right now is getting the data
needed to help Doctor Hazel predict skin cancer with at least a ninety percent
accuracy. ‘There’s a huge problem in getting AI data for medicine. It’s painful
to get the data, even from large institutions. No one wants to share . . . [b]ut
amazing results are possible. The more people share, the more accurate the
system becomes.’”).
51
Muoio, supra note 49.
52
Marchant & Tournas, supra note 40, at 23.
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Furthermore, the rapid emergence of the application of AI
within the healthcare industry, particularly within the practice of
telehealth or telemedicine, may result in some applications beyond
the comprehension of some healthcare practitioners as well as an
inability of clinical guidelines and clinical support systems to keep
pace. 53 “As technologies change so rapidly,” explain Marchant and
Tournas, “what might be malpractice if relied on today may be
negligent to not use tomorrow.” 54 Despite its quickly gaining
momentum, state and federal courts have rarely been presented
with the question of liability as it pertains to the use of AI within
the healthcare industry, specifically within the practice of
telehealth or telemedicine. 55
IV.

APPROACHES COURTS MAY TAKE WHEN FACED WITH
TELEHEALTH AND TELEMEDICINE LIABILITY ISSUES
When presented with the question of liability as it pertains to
the use of AI within the healthcare industry, the courts may
theoretically rely upon such varying theories of liability as medical
malpractice and product liability and, in cases of medical
malpractice, different standards of care. In doing so, the courts
create uncertainty for the developers of AI platforms and the
healthcare providers utilizing such platforms as to their potential
liability, jeopardizing the health and safety of patients in the
process. Indeed, “[n]o courts have yet had the opportunity to
address” the question of liability as it pertains to the use of AI
within the healthcare industry. 56

Id. at 34.
Id.
55
Id. at 33.
56
Id. at 40; see also W. Nicholson Price II et al., Potential Liability for
Physicians Using Artificial Intelligence, J. AM. MED. ASS’N (Oct. 4, 2019),
https://jamanetwork.com/journals/jama/article-abstract/2752750
[https://perma.cc/45K2-BFAJ] (“In part because AI is so new to clinical
practice, there is essentially no case law on liability involving medical AI.”).
53
54
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A. The Inconsistency in the Distinction Between Medical Device
and Medical Procedure or Service and the Effect of Such
Distinction Upon Theories of Liability
Courts face great difficulty in addressing the question of
liability as it pertains to the use of AI within the healthcare
industry and, specifically, within the practice of telehealth or
telemedicine. This difficulty is made more drastic as
administrative, legislative, and judicial bodies have yet to address
whether AI constitutes a medical device or, rather, a medical
procedure or service. 57 The distinction between medical device and
medical procedure or service limits the theories upon which the
courts currently rely when presented with questions of liability as it
pertains to the use of AI within the healthcare industry and,
specifically, within the practice of telehealth or telemedicine.
Liability for uses of AI within the healthcare industry may be
evaluated under either the traditional product liability standards for
manufactured products or under the commonplace medical
malpractice liability standards for healthcare practitioners. 58 The
medical malpractice liability standards for healthcare practitioners
and the product liability standards for manufactured products are
substantially different.
In alleging product liability, the plaintiff must demonstrate that
(1) his or her injury resulted from a product defect that rendered
the product unreasonably dangerous, and (2) the defect existed at
the time the product left the developer. 59 Product liability relies
Marchant & Tournas, supra note 40, at 32.
Id. at 26.
59
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PROD. LIAB. § 2 (AM. LAW INST.
1998); see also Jessica S. Allain, Comment, From Jeopardy! to Jaundice: The
Medical Liability Implications of Dr. Watson and Other Artificial Intelligence
Systems, 73 LA. L. REV. 1049, 1067 (2013). The requirement that the plaintiff
demonstrate the existence of a defect at the time the product left the developer
raises interesting questions for developers of artificial intelligence platforms and
the healthcare practitioners utilizing such platforms. Because artificial
intelligence platforms sometimes utilize machine learning, whereby the
platforms automatically learn and improve from experience, defects may arise
that did not exist at the time the platform left the developer. The question
remains as to whether such defects may expose developers and practitioners to
liability. Similarly, the question remains as to whether biases in the platform’s
57
58
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upon a more plaintiff-friendly, strict liability standard for design
defects, manufacturing defects, and warning defects in
manufactured products, enabling plaintiffs to prevail even in the
absence of fault or intent on the part of the defendant. 60 Further,
product liability doctrine provides for punitive damages. 61
On the other hand, in alleging medical malpractice, the plaintiff
must demonstrate that (1) the defendant healthcare practitioner
owed a duty to the plaintiff, (2) the defendant breached such duty,
and (3) the breach of such duty proximately caused injury to the
plaintiff. 62 Medical malpractice relies upon a more defendantfriendly, negligence standard, enabling plaintiffs to prevail only if
they demonstrate that defendants breached their duty to act as
reasonably prudent healthcare practitioners, often by means of the
expert testimony of other similarly situated practitioners. 63 Medical
malpractice doctrine, in contrast to product liability doctrine,
provides for a statutorily defined amount of damages. 64
If an AI platform is deemed by the FDA to constitute a medical
device, the development of the platform by the developer is
generally subject to product liability standards. 65 If the FDA deems
an AI platform to constitute a medical device, the availability of
product liability as a claim may be limited. Traditionally, for
instance, hospitals and healthcare practitioners have been rendered
immune from product liability actions arising out of the use of
medical devices because courts have held the primary function of
hospitals and practitioners to be the provision of medical
procedures or services rather than medical devices. 66 Further, the
learned intermediary doctrine may prevent the plaintiff from
bringing such a product liability action against the developer of the
decision-making that result from its learning of data constitute defects that may
expose developers and practitioners to liability.
60
Marchant & Tournas, supra note 40, at 26.
61
Id.
62
See 6 MED. MALPRAC. CHKLSTS. & DISC. § 47:15 (2019); see also Laura
E.A. Wibberley, Telemedicine in Illinois: Untangling the Complex Legal
Threads, 50 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 885, 895–96 (2017).
63
Marchant & Tournas, supra note 40, at 26.
64
Id.
65
Id. at 33.
66
Allain, supra note 59, at 1067.
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product if the developer satisfied his duty to warn users of the
potential dangers inherent in the use of the product. 67 On the other
hand, if an AI platform is deemed by the FDA to constitute a
medical procedure or service, the use of the platform by the
healthcare practitioner is generally subject to medical malpractice
standards. 68
The FDA has approved some AI platforms as medical devices
while refusing to approve other platforms as such, instead
apparently accepting them as medical procedures or services. 69 For
example, the FDA approved the AI platform developed and
utilized by researchers at Google to detect diabetic retinopathy as a
medical device. 70 A similar platform developed and utilized by
researchers at IBM, however, is accepted as a medical procedure or
service, utilized by healthcare practitioners without having
undergone approval or oversight by the FDA. 71 In approving some
AI platforms as medical devices while refusing to approve other
platforms as such, the FDA subjects the developers of similar
platforms and the healthcare practitioners utilizing such platforms
to substantially different standards, one that provides for strict
liability in the absence of fault on the part of such developers and
practitioners and the potential imposition of punitive damages, and
another that provides for liability only if such developers and
practitioners breach their duty to act reasonably.
The consequences of developers of AI platforms or the
healthcare practitioners utilizing such platforms being subjected to
different standards of product liability or medical malpractice may
be demonstrated by a hypothetical application of medical
malpractice standards to the factual scenario presented in Taylor v.

67

Id.
Marchant & Tournas, supra note 40, at 33.
69
Id. at 32.
70
U.S. Food & Drug Admin., FDA Permits Marketing of Artificial
Intelligence-Based Device to Detect Certain Diabetes-Related Eye Problems,
(Apr.
11,
2018),
https://www.fda.gov/news-events/pressFDA.GOV
announcements/fda-permits-marketing-artificial-intelligence-based-devicedetect-certain-diabetes-related-eye [https://perma.cc/PAS4-EU7B].
71
Marchant & Tournas, supra note 40, at 32.
68
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Intuitive Surgical. 72 The factual scenario in Taylor demonstrated an
ambiguity as to whether an AI platform or the healthcare
practitioner operating such a platform was culpable for the harm
suffered by the plaintiff. 73
In Taylor, the plaintiff brought a product liability claim against
the manufacturer of a robotic surgical system that utilized AI for
injuries sustained by a patient who had been operated upon by the
system, even when the surgeon operating the system may have
been more responsible for the errors that caused the injuries than
the manufacturer. 74 The surgeon was trained and credentialed to
operate the system. 75 As part of his training, the surgeon received a
manual that recommended that the maximum body mass index for
candidates eligible for operation be set at thirty. 76 Nonetheless, the
patient who had been operated upon presented to the surgeon with
a body mass index of thirty-nine. 77 The patient suffered from
severe complications throughout the surgery and thereafter
required assistance with ambulating and breathing, eventually
passing away within four years after his having been operated on. 78
The Washington Court of Appeals affirmed the jury’s decision
finding for the manufacturer, holding that the manufacturer
provided adequate warning to the surgeon and, thereby, satisfied
its duty to provide a warning regarding the nature of the system it
had developed. 79
Alternatively, had the plaintiff brought a medical malpractice
claim against the surgeon operating the system, the jury may have
decided for the plaintiff, especially since the decision by the
surgeon to operate on a patient who presented with a body mass
index of thirty-nine, in contravention of the recommendation that
the maximum body mass index for candidates eligible for
Taylor v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 355 P.3d 309 (Wash. Ct. App. 2015), aff’g
Case No. 09-2-03136-5 (Wash. Superior Ct. 2013).
73
Id.
74
Id. at 312.
75
Id. at 311.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id. at 312.
79
Id.
72
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operation be set at thirty, may constitute a breach of the duty of the
surgeon to exercise reasonable care. Thus, the potential
determination by the FDA that the system either constitutes a
medical device or a medical procedure or service may have
foreclosed the plaintiff from bringing particular claims or relying
upon particular standards, each of which provide for different
assessments of fault and damages. Accordingly, the inconsistency
in the distinction between medical device and medical procedure
or service creates uncertainty not only for courts but, also, for the
developers of AI platforms and the healthcare providers utilizing
such platforms as to the potential liability of developers and
providers, jeopardizing the health and safety of patients in the
process.
B. The Inconsistency in the Application of Different Sets of
Legislation and Regulation and the Effect of Such Application
Upon Applicable Standards of Care and Preemption
Conditions
The courts face further difficulty in addressing the question of
liability as it pertains to the use of AI within the healthcare
industry and, specifically, within the practice of telehealth or
telemedicine, because medical devices and medical procedures or
services are subject to different sets of legislation and regulation.
The federal government is tasked with legislating, and the FDA is
tasked with regulating, medical products. 80 State governments, on
the other hand, are tasked with legislating and regulating the
practice of medicine, including medical procedures or services. 81
See Bill Sutton, Overview of Regulatory Requirements: Medical Devices –
Transcript, FDA.GOV (Nov. 2011), https://www.fda.gov/training-andcontinuing-education/cdrh-learn/overview-regulatory-requirements-medicaldevices-transcript [https://perma.cc/KQ2R-JDBY] (“The US Food and Drug
Administration (FDA) is responsible for regulating and supervising the safety of
foods, dietary supplements, drugs, vaccine, biological medical products, blood
products, medical devices, radiation-emitting products, veterinary products, and
cosmetics.”).
81
See generally Richard Epstein, Government Regulation of the Practice of
Medicine: How the FDA Overreaches the Regulation of Medical Practice,
L.
SCH.:
BILL
OF
HEALTH
(Sept.
30,
2013),
HARV.
http://blog.petrieflom.law.harvard.edu/2013/09/30/government-regulation-of80
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Such legislation and regulation render more difficult analyses
of questions of liability raised by applications of AI within the
healthcare industry, especially considering that such legislation and
regulation establish different standards of care to which healthcare
developers and practitioners are expected to adhere. Twenty-nine
states, for instance, require the same standard of care for telehealth
or telemedicine applications of AI as is required for traditional, inperson visits with healthcare practitioners. 82 “The issue is that the
standards of care for traditional in-person encounters vary by
state.” 83
In Georgia, for instance, healthcare practitioners must exercise
a reasonable degree of care, interpreted to encompass the degree of
care that the general, nationwide healthcare profession ordinarily
exercises under the same or similar conditions and circumstances,
attested to by an expert witness. 84 Other states, such as Idaho and
Washington, require the degree of care ordinarily exercised under
the same or similar conditions to account for care ordinarily
exercised within the same community or locality. 85 A standard of
care that accounts for community or locality generally requires that
the expert witness attesting to the standard hail from the same
community or locality as the defendant and compare the care
provided by the defendant to the applicable standard in the
community or locality within which the care was provided. 86
Standards of care, however, are still subject to state-by-state
variations in the geographic scope of the applicable community or
locality. Idaho, for instance, limits the applicable community or
the-practice-of-medicine-how-the-fda-overreaches-the-regulation-of-medicalpractice-2/ [https://perma.cc/4M7X-XJB5].
82
Adelyn B. Boleman, Comment, Georgia’s Telemedicine Laws and
Regulations: Protecting Against Health Care Access, 68 MERCER L. REV. 489,
507 (2017) (stating the standard of care established within the states wherein the
patient is seen governs).
83
Id. at 508.
84
See Smith v. Finch, 681 S.E.2d 147, 149 (Ga. 2009); see also Kapsch v.
Stowers, 434 S.E.2d 539, 540 (Ga. 1993) (holding Georgia has already
embraced the national standard of care to good effect).
85
See, e.g., Idaho Code Ann. § 6-1012 (1976); see also Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 7.70.040(1) (2011).
86
See, e.g., Sheeley v. Mem’l Hosp., 710 A.2d 161, 165–66 (R.I. 1998).
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locality to the geographic area typically served by the hospital, but
if no such hospital exists, a geographic area similar to that within
which the care was provided may constitute the applicable
locality. 87 Washington, on the other hand, expands the applicable
community or locality to the entire state of Washington. 88 Other
states, such as Louisiana, have adopted a hybrid standard of care,
which comprises elements of the national standard adopted by
Georgia and the community or locality standards adopted by Idaho
and Washington. 89 Specifically, hybrid states require that
specialists abide by the national standard and that general
practitioners abide by the community or locality standard. 90
Such inconsistent legislation and regulation render analyses of
liability raised by applications of AI within the healthcare industry
more complex, especially considering that this legislation and
regulation subject applications of AI to different preemption
conditions. 91 Indeed, when the FDA approves an AI platform as a
medical device subject to FDA regulations, the FDA partly
preempts product liability claims against healthcare developers. 92
Alternatively, when the FDA refuses to approve an AI platform as
a medical device subject to FDA regulations because use of the
platform constitutes the practice of medicine, individuals may
bring liability claims against healthcare developers and
practitioners, including medical malpractice and product liability
claims. 93 Such inconsistency in the application of different sets of
legislation and regulation—and, specifically, in the application of
different standards of care and preemption conditions—may
Idaho Code Ann. § 6-1012.
Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 7.70.040(1).
89
See, e.g., Ray v. Ameri-Care Hosp., 400 So. 2d 1127, 1137–38 (La. Ct.
App. 1981), writ denied, 404 So. 2d 277 (La. 1981) (Specialists are “subject to
the higher standard of care ordinarily practiced by physicians within that
particular specialty rather than the standard of care exercised by generalist
physicians practicing in the same community. The locality factor is no longer
involved in determining the standard of care required of specialists in
malpractice suits.”).
90
Id.
91
Marchant & Tournas, supra note 40, at 33.
92
Id.
93
Id.
87
88
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further create additional uncertainty for courts, developers of AI
platforms, and healthcare providers utilizing such platforms as to
the potential liability of developers and providers. In doing so, this
inconsistency may further jeopardize the health and safety of
patients.
Indeed, because of the inconsistency in the establishment of
different standards of care, “the ‘safest’ way to use medical
[artificial intelligence] from a liability perspective is as a
confirmatory tool to support existing decision-making processes
rather than as a source of ways to improve care.” 94 Even where AI
platforms provide for more accurate assessments of patient
conditions, such as the platform developed by Stanford researchers
which correctly diagnosed tuberculosis among patients at a higher
rate than healthcare practitioners, the inconsistency in the
establishment of different standards of care incentivizes
practitioners to reject such assessments out of fear that their
accepting may fall short of the degree of care exercised by
practitioners nationally or those within the same community or
locality. 95 “Without legislation enacted specifically to
accommodate this new technology or sufficient case law to
establish precedent on the legal issues raised, courts are forced to
analogize new technologies to previous ones for which laws
exist.” 96
Thus, when faced with the question of liability as it pertains to
the use of AI within the healthcare industry and, specifically,
within the practices of telehealth or telemedicine, courts ought to
reestablish the demarcation between medical malpractice liability
and product liability, clarifying for healthcare developers and
practitioners the standards to which they will be expected to adhere
and safeguarding patients in the process. The predicament at hand
has been summarized as follows:
If the machine is evaluated under a different standard than the human
doctor who it replaces in performing a specific task, this discrepancy
Price II et al., supra note 56.
See id.
96
Amanda Swanson & Fazal Khan, The Legal Challenge of Incorporating
Artificial Intelligence into Medical Practice, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L. 90, 116
(2012).
94
95
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may bias the outcome of a head-to-head competition between human
and machine. Imposing a higher standard on the AI machine may
deprive patients of better care and could deprive the health system of
potential cost savings provided by an AI system. On the other hand,
imposing a lower standard of care on the AI machine may encourage
the offering of substandard care. 97

In other words, the ambiguity in the standards to which
healthcare developers and practitioners are expected to adhere
jeopardizes the health and safety of patients, rendering a
clarification by the courts much more necessary.
V.

A RECOMMENDATION AS TO HOW THE COURTS OUGHT
TO MODIFY THEIR APPROACH WHEN FACED WITH SUCH
LIABILITY ISSUES
Such a predicament may be abridged by a more uniform
adoption of existing theories of liability and standards of care by
the courts. With the assistance of federal legislation or
administrative regulation, perhaps promulgated by the FDA, courts
could and ought to adopt a new guiding principle. Further, courts
should frame the question of liability as it pertains to the use of AI
within the healthcare industry and, specifically, within the practice
of telehealth or telemedicine as one of either medical malpractice
or product liability. In deciding between the two theories of
liability, the courts should account for the extent to which AI
platforms dictate the course of the healthcare provided to
patients. 98
For instance, if AI platforms completely depose the
professional judgment of healthcare practitioners and if they err in
their observations or recommendations based upon their internal
machine learning mechanisms, they should be held to malpractice
liability standards. 99 The standard of care to which such platforms
will be expected to adhere ought to be that of the reasonably
prudent healthcare practitioner whose professional judgment would
have governed in the absence of such platforms. Some states,
including Colorado and Mississippi, have established the standard
Marchant & Tournas, supra note 40, at 38–39.
Id. at 39.
99
Id.
97
98
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of care to which such platforms will be expected to adhere as that
of the reasonably prudent healthcare practitioner whose
professional judgment would have governed in the absence of such
platforms. 100 Twenty-nine medical boards, including that of
Georgia, have also established a similar standard of care. 101 Given
variation between the different standards of care established by the
states, as well as the fact that telehealth or telemedicine
applications of AI enable healthcare services to be provided across
different states, courts should hold the standard of care to which
such applications will be expected to adhere on a national basis.
The standard of care should be that of the general, reasonably
prudent healthcare practitioner whose professional judgment would
have governed in the absence of such platforms, without
accounting for community or local variation. 102 Such applications
would, therefore, be held to the same standard, regardless of the
physical location of either the healthcare practitioner or his or her
patient. 103
Undeniably, some cases may arise in which AI platforms err in
their observations or recommendations based upon their internal
learning mechanisms as well as defects in their design,
manufacture, or warnings. In such cases, the decision between the
two theories of liability ought to be dependent upon whether
internal learning mechanisms or defects in design, manufacture, or
warning are more responsible for the harm suffered by the patient.
Where the AI platforms err in their observations or
recommendations based upon defects in their design, manufacture,
or warnings, they ought to be held to product liability standards.
In modifying their approach to the question of liability as it
pertains to the use of AI within the healthcare industry and,
specifically, within the practice of telehealth or telemedicine, the
See, e.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 10-16-123(2) (2016) (“Any health
benefits provided through telemedicine shall meet the same standard of care as
for in-person care.”); Miss. Code Ann. § 83-9-353(2) (2014) (“Treatment
recommendations made via electronic means shall be held to the same standards
of appropriate practice as those in traditional provider-patient setting.”).
101
Boleman, supra note 82, at 507.
102
Id. at 517.
103
Id.
100
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courts may address the very issues arising from the inconsistency
in the distinction between medical device and medical procedure
or service and the fact that such a distinction limits the theories
upon which the courts currently rely. By accounting for the extent
to which AI platforms dictate the course of the healthcare provided
to patients, rather than whether the platforms are deemed to be
medical devices or medical procedures or services, courts may
subject developers of similar AI platforms and healthcare
practitioners utilizing such platforms to the same standards. In
doing so, courts may provide clarity for developers and
practitioners as to their potential liability and safeguard the health
and safety of patients in the process.
In modifying their approach, courts may also address the very
issues arising from the inconsistency in the application of different
sets of legislation and regulation to AI platforms and, specifically,
in the application of different standards of care and preemption
conditions for such platforms. By assessing the standard of care to
which these platforms will be expected to adhere on a national
basis—as that of the general, reasonably prudent healthcare
practitioner whose professional judgment would have governed in
the absence of such platforms, without account for community or
local variation—courts may subject the developers of AI platforms
and the healthcare practitioners utilizing such platforms to the
same, singular standard of care, despite community or local
variation in the development, marketing, sale, and utilization of
these platforms. In doing so, the courts may ensure fairness for the
various developers, healthcare practitioners, and the patients that
are developing, utilizing, and being subjected to such platforms.
The courts may, further, provide clarity for developers and
practitioners as to their potential liability, regardless of whether an
AI platform or a practitioner erred in the healthcare provided to the
patient, and safeguard the health and safety of patients in the
process.
Again, the use of AI within the practice of telehealth or
telemedicine has demonstrated significant benefits. For example,
use of AI technology has been accompanied by reductions in
healthcare expenditures by healthcare insurers and providers.
Additionally, patients have seen positive effects on clinical
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outcomes, and AI technology has increased patient satisfaction,
despite differences in patient age, education, gender, income,
insurance, and race. 104 Thus, in modifying their approach to the
question of liability as it pertains to the use of AI within the
healthcare industry and, specifically, within the practice of
telehealth or telemedicine, courts should remain cognizant of such
benefits, careful not to deter developers from developing
innovative AI platforms. Indeed, “the pharmaceutical and medical
device industries often rail against the obstructionism of the federal
government towards new medical technologies.” 105 This modified
approach, however, remains sensitive to such concerns, allowing
for safeguards that aim to ensure that developers are not deterred
from developing innovative AI platforms.
For instance, one safeguard may be the introduction of a
legislative or regulatory requirement that healthcare practitioners
meaningfully review the observations or recommendations of AI
platforms, thereby reducing liability exposure where such
platforms err in their observations or recommendations based upon
their internal machine learning mechanisms or defects in their
design, manufacture, or warnings.106 “Freezing the standard of care
to require meaningful human participation would head off [the]
consequences [of liability],” notes Froomkin. 107
Nonetheless, any legislative or regulatory requirement that
healthcare practitioners “meaningfully” review the observations or
recommendations of AI platforms may be difficult to implement.
For instance, the determination of the extent to which practitioners
are required to review the observations or recommendations of AI
platforms, may be complicated by the fact that the capabilities of
AI platforms are continually being enhanced. 108 “In the abstract,

Am. Telemedicine Ass’n., supra note 27, at 1–6.
Khan, supra note 31, at 142.
106
A Michael Froomkin et al., When AIs Outperform Doctors: Confronting
the Challenges of a Tort-Induced Over-Reliance on Machine Learning, 61 ARIZ.
L. REV. 33, 97 (2019).
107
Id.
108
See id.
104
105
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however, it is very hard to define the appropriate level of review
with any precision.” 109
Accordingly, the extent to which practitioners will be required
to review the observations or recommendations of AI platforms
may need to be determined on a case-by-case basis rather than
subjected to a firm standard. 110 Any legislative or regulatory
requirement that healthcare practitioners meaningfully review the
observations or recommendations of AI platforms may invite more
inefficiency in healthcare decision-making. 111 Moreover, and
relatedly, any legislative or regulatory requirement that healthcare
practitioners
meaningfully
review
observations
or
recommendations of AI platforms, may be incredibly costly to
healthcare practitioners and their patients. 112 Indeed, such a
requirement may risk “forgoing a larger number of beneficial
outcomes that will not happen because the [artificial intelligence]
plus physician is too expensive. The risk here is that some people
may not be able to afford the care that they otherwise might have
had.” 113
Another safeguard that aims to ensure that developers are not
deterred from developing innovative AI platforms may be the
introduction of some arrangement of “enterprise liability” in which
developers of AI platforms, healthcare practitioners, or hospitals
utilizing such platforms pay the federal government an excise tax
for their development or utilization of such platforms. 114 This
enables the federal government to establish a compensation
program for patients injured as a result of such development or
utilization. 115 The healthcare industry is well-suited for the theory
of enterprise liability because (1) the industry can reasonably
expect and insure against the potential injuries that may be caused
by AI platforms after consideration of its past experiences with
such platforms and resulting clinical outcomes; (2) the industry is
109

Id.
See id.
111
Id.
112
Id.
113
Id.
114
Swanson & Khan, supra note 96, at. 135–36.
115
Id.
110
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well-equipped to develop and implement quality assurance
programs that can mitigate the potential for injuries that may be
caused by such platforms; and (3) the industry stands in the best
financial position to distribute and sustain the losses that may be
caused by such platforms. 116
One arrangement of enterprise liability that may serve as a
model is the Vaccine Compensation Program, established by the
National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act. 117 The Act enabled prompt
and adequate “compensation to be paid for vaccine-related injury
or death” while maintaining the “nation’s supply of vaccines by
insulating manufacturers from liability.” 118 The Program requires
that an excise tax be placed on every vaccine dose administered
and that patients injured by vaccines “bring their claims in the U.S.
Court of Federal Claims before seeking other remedies against”
developers of vaccines or healthcare practitioners administering
such vaccines. 119 An arrangement similar to the Vaccine
Compensation Program may “[impose] the burdens ensuring the
safety of [AI] technologies on the healthcare industry as a whole,
thereby relieving individual physicians [and developers] from
liability for technology’s few but inevitable failures.” 120
VI.
CONCLUSION
The use of AI within the healthcare industry is quickly gaining
momentum. The state and federal effort to contain the spread of the
novel Coronavirus, for instance, has resulted in an increase in the
use of AI within the healthcare industry, especially within the
practice of telehealth or telemedicine, as state and federal
governments have relaxed regulations governing the use thereof. 121
Id. at 136–37.
Id. at 143.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Id. at 135.
121
See Jennifer Kay, Florida Providing Free Telehealth, Flu Shots for State
Employees, BLOOMBERG L. (Mar. 26, 2020), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/
health-law-and-business/florida-providing-free-telehealth-flu-shots-for-stateemployees [https://perma.cc/92FT-LQYX] (state government response); see
also Anjali N.C. Downs et al., Insights: Waived Medicare Telehealth
116
117
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On March 26, 2020, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis signed an
executive order requiring the State Group Insurance Program,
which provides coverage to state employees and their dependents,
to include within its coverage telehealth or telemedicine services at
no additional cost to beneficiaries. 122 Similarly, on March 6, 2020,
President Donald Trump signed into law the Coronavirus
Preparedness and Response Supplemental Appropriations Act,
enabling the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services to
expand coverage of telehealth or telemedicine services to all
Medicare beneficiaries, regardless of their location. 123
State and federal courts, however, have rarely been presented
with the question of liability as it pertains to the use of AI within
the healthcare industry, specifically within the practice of
telehealth or telemedicine. The courts face great difficulty in
addressing such a question of liability, particularly given the
inconsistencies in the distinction between medical device and
medical procedure or service and in the application of different sets
of legislation and regulation to AI platforms.
Such inconsistencies create uncertainty not only for the courts
but, also, for the developers of AI platforms and the healthcare
providers utilizing such platforms as to the potential liability of
developers and providers, jeopardizing the health and safety of
patients in the process. This uncertainty may be abridged by a
more uniform adoption of existing theories of liability and
standards of care by the courts. With the assistance of federal
legislation or administrative regulation, perhaps promulgated by
the FDA, courts ought to adopt a new guiding principle and frame
the question of liability as one of either medical malpractice or
Copayments Leave Unanswered Questions, BLOOMBERG L. (March 27, 2020),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/insights-waivedmedicare-telehealth-copayments-leave-unanswered-questions
[https://perma.cc/9WFW-QWEG] (federal government response).
122
See Kay, supra note 121.
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See Anjali N.C. Downs et al., Insight: Key Medicare Telehealth, HIPAA
Changes During Coronavirus Pandemic, BLOOMBERG L. (March 26, 2020),
https://news.bloomberglaw.com/health-law-and-business/insight-key-medicaretelehealth-hipaa-changes-during-coronavirus-pandemic [https://perma.cc/83U33XEX].
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product liability. In deciding between the two theories of liability,
courts should account for the extent to which AI platforms dictate
the course of the healthcare provided to patients. Courts ought to
assess the standard of care to which such applications will be
expected to adhere on a national basis.
A more uniform adoption of existing theories of liability and
standards of care by the courts may ensure that developers and
healthcare providers are held more accountable for their negligent
development and use of AI and that patients are safeguarded in the
process. In modifying their approach to the question of liability,
courts should remain careful not to deter developers from
developing innovative AI platforms. The modified approach,
however, remains sensitive to such concerns, allowing for
safeguards that may ensure that developers are not so deterred.

